I wrote previously on the theme that Freud is being replaced with physical identity models. The imprehension or insight with these things is that new definitions may serve old purposes. Essentially, matter (sometimes called information, sometimes called language) always has a power to signify. Whether these meanings are universal or technical, personal or idiomatic, the nature of materials is quintessentially subject to definitions.
Therefore, the cosmic flux, therefore the insight: physical and cognitive theories have a weakness, that is, a weakness of definitions.
Psychologically, what we have realized is that everything is subject to desire. Laws can become relativistic, subject and references can be modified, if it means that these new contents or ideologies serve the interest—be it genetic, ambitious, or merely inflective—of those who make decisions about information.
And it is not that the conditional reality of decision-makers has a lot to do with it. These decision-makers have little direct control over the nature of information. They are as determined by context as are others. Perhaps more so. So the information that floods through their system may as easily be defined by someone who invented a new neologism, or coined a popular expression, as someone who “controls” information, whether economically, politically, or socially. These people are just trying to be pragmatists. They have information overload.
So information is really the determining factor, but it turns out that information is subject to definitions. So in the future, when I think of math problems, as soon as we get a grip on the idea that math has a cognitive reality—that it REALLY exists inside our brains, this will create a cosmic shift in the way we process information.
At first, people will think, ‘we can do math problems’. But secondly, people will think, ‘what does it feel like to do a math problem?’ At that point the tide begins to shift. What I initially expected to be merely an aesthetic judgment about the nature of math may be something much more. It may be a psychological appreciation of originality and the texture of mental cognition. In short, there is an inevitable drift for cognition to become more emotional.
People will see math and other applications as ‘games’, or applications, which have consumer value. At that point, it is no longer a reference book, or the ‘stark page’ which defines the factors involved in appreciating mathematics. Instead, there will be an effort to realize how math and other disciplines—or their applications—have genuine cognitive value. How do we ‘feel’ like mathematicians. And I will warn, not in every case do we think that this emotional side of cognition is superficial. In some cases, in cases of the mind-brain identity theory, we must accept that—whether genetically, informationally, linguistically, causally, etc.—there is some link between thought and the empirical sensory process that is actually involved.
On the one hand, there is a potential folly to apperceive that these aspects and conjunctions are merely a ‘drug’ in our brains. That is the functionalist approach. But someone will realize, brains THEMSELVES are capable of function. There will be a revolution for INNATE PROCESSING, and the REAL EMOTIONAL SCHEMYSTRY involved in making syntactical and semantic decisions.
Furthermore, we should not make an applications error, and assume that mathematics or some other ‘gamification’ application is merely a product of syntactic or semantic functions. Instead, we should accept that there is an APPLIED FUNCTION, in which the connexion between our mind and our language has reality.
Whether it is informationally, or genetically, or linguistically, or in raw processing, the emotional nature of the experience of any given intellectual context must be realized.
Not only must these disciplines be formalized in the real context of mental function, but they must—as I have said earlier—integrate with the consumer aspect of brain functioning.
The inevitable conclusion is that math in particular will be subject to new definitions which are contingent on the highly specific operability of the mind—genetically, informationally, linguistically, and in terms of pure processing—such that the emotional weight of concepts and processes is bound to figure into the mix of contingencies.
And I argue, that contingency of thought upon the mind is subject to a SYNAPSE CONDITION, whereby concepts once thought to be language tools, will now be thought-of as located WITHIN THE MIND, assessed in terms of networks of genetic, informational, linguistic, and pure processing associations.
Even if the function of the brain changes, or if the nature of information changes, we should be prepared to accept ONE contingency, the actual condition of the mind, named EMOTIONAL COGNITION.